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VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Roanoke, Virginia – July 26, 2016

GREEN BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 6 in the GREEN Answer Booklet 6
6.
Lincoln Insurance Company (“Lincoln”) provided property insurance coverage for real
and personal property owned by George Mason University (“GMU”). Lincoln is an Illinois
corporation with its executive officers, including its president, chief operating officer and chief
financial officer, in Chicago, Illinois. Lincoln’s worldwide advertising office is located in Tysons,
Virginia. Lincoln is qualified to do business in Virginia as a foreign corporation, according to the
Virginia State Corporation Commission.
GMU is a public (or “state”) university. The Code of Virginia provides that GMU is “subject
at all times to the control of the General Assembly” and that the real and personal property of GMU is
“the property of the Commonwealth of Virginia.”
In the last week of April 2015, following a storm, rainwater flooded certain buildings on
GMU’s campus in the City of Fairfax, Virginia (“City”), causing $2.5 million in property damage.
GMU timely filed an insurance claim of $2.5 million, which following investigation, was fully paid
by Lincoln.
Lincoln, as subrogee of GMU, thereafter sued the City of Fairfax in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. The complaint alleged that the City’s negligence in the planning,
design, engineering, construction and maintenance of its storm sewer system caused the flooding of
the GMU campus, and sought to recover the $2.5 million on two theories: first, that the City by its
negligence created a legal nuisance, and second, that the damage resulting therefrom was a
compensable “taking” of GMU’s property by the City in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the
Virginia Constitution, which provides that, “[n]o private property shall be damaged or taken for
public use without just compensation to the owner thereof.”
The City’s attorneys timely filed an answer, including affirmative defenses, and a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that (1) the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that GMU
is an indispensable, real party in interest, the joinder of which would destroy diversity of citizenship,
and (2) the complaint’s claims are barred by Section 15.2-970 of the Code of Virginia, which states in
part:
A. Any locality may construct a dam, levee, seawall or other structure or device …
hereinafter referred to as “works,” the purpose of which is to prevent the tidal erosion,
flooding or inundation of such locality, or part thereof…
B. No person, association, or political subdivision shall bring any action at law or suit in
equity against any locality because of, or arising out of, the design, maintenance, performance,
operation or existence of such works but nothing herein shall prevent any such action or suit
based upon a written contract. This provision shall not be construed to authorize the taking of
private property without just compensation therefor and provided further that the tidal erosion,
flooding or inundation of any lands of any other person by the construction of a dam or levee
to impound or control fresh water shall be a taking of such land within the meaning of the
foregoing provision.
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The parties have stipulated that the City is a “locality” and that that the City’s storm sewer
system is a “work” as those terms are used in Section 15.2-970 above. Also, it is undisputed that the
City was negligent in the construction and maintenance of its storm sewer system.
The District Court judge asks you, as her law clerk, to answer the following questions:
(a)

How should the Court rule (i) on the merits of the City’s argument that
GMU is an indispensable, real party in interest, and (ii) on the motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction? Explain fully.

(b)

On the facts, could Lincoln prove that the City created a legal nuisance, and
may Lincoln recover on such a claim? Explain fully.

(c)

On the facts, could Lincoln prove that the damage caused by the flooding
was a “taking” of GMU’s property, and may Lincoln recover on such a
claim? Explain fully.
*****

PURPLE BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 7 in the PURPLE Answer Booklet 7
7.
Cassius Ali (“Ali”), CEO of Fight Club International, LLC (“Fight Club”), a
franchisor of boxing fitness centers, located in Richmond, Virginia, usually kept the company
checkbook on the desk in his private office. All of the checks were imprinted with Fight Club’s name
and address and words “Chief Executive Officer” beneath the signature line. The checking account
was maintained at RVA Bank.
Sonny Frazier (“Frazier”) was a salesman working for Fight Club. One weekend after
working late, Frazier entered Ali’s office and saw the checkbook. He stole a blank check, made it out
to himself for $4,500, and, being familiar with Ali’s signature, carefully signed a reasonable facsimile
of it on the signature line.
Frazier purchased and took delivery of a new Apple desktop computer and four Apple
iPhones from Computer City, a local electronics dealer, and endorsed the stolen check with his own
name. Computer City accepted the check in payment for the computer and iPhones. Frazier then left
town, and his whereabouts are unknown. Computer City presented the check to RVA Bank, which
paid the check in cash.
When Ali received the next monthly statement from RVA Bank, he noticed the $4,500
cancelled check. He immediately notified RVA Bank that it was a forged check and demanded that
the bank credit Fight Club’s account with $4,500.
(a)

Must RVA Bank credit Fight Club’s account? Explain fully.

(b)

What arguments should Computer City make in response to a suit by RVA
Bank to recover the $4,500 from Computer City? Explain fully.
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*****

GOLD BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 8 in the GOLD Answer Booklet 8
8.
Scout, an investment banker from Norfolk, Virginia, needed a break from the
corporate world and decided to go on a “thru-hike” of the Appalachian Trail, backpacking from
Georgia to Maine. Before she left, Scout dropped off her guitar, weight-lifting equipment, and fish
tank at her friend Jimmy’s house. Jimmy agreed to store the property in his basement at no charge.
Scout signed an enforceable contract with Point to Point, Inc., an automobile transportation
company, to ship her car to her grandmother’s house in Richmond, Virginia, where Scout intended to
pick up the car upon completion of her trip.
Scout delivered the remainder of her personal possessions to Friendly Storage, a local storage
facility. Scout entered into an enforceable contract with Friendly Storage and paid in full the storage
fees for the upcoming year to avoid the hassle of payment during her trip. With the peace of mind
that her possessions were in good hands, Scout embarked on her adventure.
While Scout was traversing the Appalachian Trail, the moisture in Jimmy’s basement—as a
result of the unpredictably high rainfall—caused irreparable damage to Scout’s guitar.
Instead of delivering Scout’s car to her grandmother’s house, Point to Point, Inc. delivered the
car to the homeless shelter next door. The homeless shelter, believing the car to be a donation, sold it
to Morgan (the head of household of a local needy family) for $1,000, which, consistent with disposal
of donated property, was much less than the $4,000 retail value of the car.
To make matters worse, only a month after Scout paid him, the owner of Friendly Storage
mistakenly confused Scout’s storage locker for that of a delinquent customer. At a blind bulk auction
where potential buyers bid on the entire contents sight unseen, the high bidder paid almost 200% of
the value of Scout’s possessions.
Having decided to go completely “off the grid” during her trek, Scout was unaware of these
happenings until she returned many months later. Upon her return, Scout’s feeling of personal
accomplishment quickly turned to distress when she realized what happened to her belongings in her
absence.
(a)

Is Scout likely to prevail in a suit for negligence against Jimmy to recover
for the damage to her guitar? Explain fully.

(b)

Is there an action Scout can file against Morgan in General District Court
to recover the car, and is Scout likely to prevail? Explain fully.

(c)

On what theories may Scout state a claim against Friendly Storage to
recover for the loss of her personal possessions; is she likely to prevail on
each; and how much would she be entitled to recover if she prevails?
Explain fully.
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*****

ORANGE BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 9 in the ORANGE Answer Booklet 9
9.
Blake is the owner of Spartan Metal Buildings, Inc., (“SMB”), a metal fabricator
located in an industrial park in Salem, Virginia. Periodically, SMB needs to clear its storage yard of
accumulated scrap metal.
One day at lunch with his friend Drew, who had just been laid off from his job, Blake was
complaining about having to do the cleanup. Drew said he needed the work and asked Blake if he
could help with the cleanup, take away the scrap metal on his flatbed truck, and, by way of
compensation, sell the scrap metal and keep the proceeds. Blake agreed, and they met later that
afternoon in the SMB yard.
For two hours, Blake directed his employees and Drew as they moved all of the scrap metal
into a large pile. Blake operated a crane to load some of the larger pieces on the back of Drew’s
flatbed truck. While moving one of the larger pieces, Drew tried to guide it onto the truck. At that
time, the crane was dangerously close to a power line which crossed the yard. The metal piece Drew
was guiding onto the truck came into contact with the power line and Drew was severely burned.
Drew survived the incident but amassed over $400,000 in medical expenses to be treated for his
injuries. He filed a claim with SMB’s insurance carrier for workers’ compensation benefits, but the
claim was denied.
Drew filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Salem alleging negligence against
Blake and SMB (“Defendants”) for personal injuries that he sustained. The Defendants answered
with a general denial. When Blake was deposed in the discovery process, he testified: (1) that he
was aware of the low height of the electrical line across the yard; (2) he should have warned Drew to
stay clear from the crane and the scrap metal being moved; and (3) he was distracted just prior to the
incident when his cell phone vibrated in his rear pocket, and he was reaching to check it when the
incident occurred.
Drew filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Blake and SMB (under a theory of
respondeat superior) were negligent as a matter of law based upon Blake’s own party admissions
made in his deposition. The Defendants opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that (1)
Drew, as a plaintiff, is not entitled to move for summary judgment, and (2) in the alternative,
summary judgment cannot be granted because the motion relies upon Blake’s deposition testimony.
The Circuit Court for the City of Salem agreed with both of the Defendants’ arguments and denied
the Motion for Summary Judgment.
A month before trial, the Defendants filed a Plea in Bar alleging that the Circuit Court had no
subject matter jurisdiction over Drew’s claim because at the time of the accident Drew was a
“statutory employee” of SMB whose exclusive remedy for his injuries was under the Virginia
Workers’ Compensation Act. Drew filed a Response in Opposition to the Plea in Bar asserting only
that the Defendants waived any objection to jurisdiction because they had not raised this defense in
their Answer to the Complaint.
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By Final Order dated May 22, 2016, the Circuit Court granted the Defendants’ Plea in Bar,
holding that Drew was a statutory employee of Blake and SMB and that subject matter jurisdiction
could not be waived by the Defendants.
On June 15, 2016, Drew filed a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Circuit Court. He
believes, but is uncertain, that he has an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia as a matter of right.
He intends to base his appeal on the following assignments of error:
1. That the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds
that it did.
2. That the Defendants’ “exclusive remedy” jurisdictional objection was waived because it
was not raised as a defense in their Answer to the Complaint.
3. The Defendants should have been estopped from asserting the jurisdictional objection
because SMB’s insurance carrier denied his claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
(a)

Did Drew timely file his Notice of Appeal? Explain fully.

(b)

Does Drew have an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia as a matter of
right? Explain fully.

(c)

If his case properly comes before the Supreme Court of Virginia, what
disposition will the Court make on each of the enumerated assignments of
error? Explain fully.
*****

